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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________________ 
 
NO. 10-2149 
____________________ 
 
 
RICHARD BADWAY 
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD BADWAY, JR. 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
____________________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-01333) 
District Judge:  Hon. John R. Padova 
 
____________________ 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2011 
 
 
BEFORE:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
________________________ 
 
(Opinion filed   February 11, 2011  ) 
________________________ 
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_________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________________ 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Richard Badway, Jr., collapsed at 1:00 A.M. on October 22, 2005.  His 
girlfriend immediately called 911 and was assured that Ahelp was on the way.@  
Appellant=s Br. at 7.  Tragically, help did not arrive in time to prevent his death.  
The cause of death was cardiac dysrhythmia.  Richard=s executor brought this 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 against the City of Philadelphia, 
asserting that it Aknew that its EMS custom, policy, and procedures could cause 
death, and acted with deliberate indifference as to Philadelphians= right to life 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.@  Appellant=s Br. at 15.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the City, and this appeal followed. 
We will affirm for the reasons set forth in the thorough opinion of the 
District Court.  The Due Process Clause Aforbids the State itself to deprive 
individuals of life, liberty, or property without >due process of law,= but its language 
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to 
ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.@  
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Soc. Servs. Dep=t, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).  
Thus, Athere is no federal constitutional right to rescue services, competent or 
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otherwise@ and the Fourteenth Amendment does not Aplace an affirmative 
obligation on the State to provide competent rescue services if it chooses to 
provide them.@  Brown v. Pa. Dep=t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training 
Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 2003).  Appellant does not maintain before us 
that the two exceptions to these principles B the special relationship exception 
and the state-created danger exception B are applicable here. 
Appellant contends that once the state undertakes to provide emergency 
services B whether or not those services are constitutionally mandated in the first 
place B it must do so in a way that does not cause constitutional injury.  As 
Appellant sees it, by inducing the public to rely on flawed emergency services, 
the City is liable for the deprivation of Richard=s life.  However, that is essentially 
the same argument that we rejected in Brown.  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged 
that Athe City of Philadelphia had a number of policies involving [emergency 
medical technicians] which were enacted with deliberate indifference and which 
caused harm to them and their son.@  Brown, 318 F.3d at 483.  We determined 
that A[e]ven if we accept everything Appellants allege as true, they will have still 
failed to establish that the City=s policies caused constitutional harm.  The City 
was under no constitutional obligation to provide competent rescue services.@  Id. 
(original emphasis).  Though Appellant seems to argue that it was the delay in the 
arrival of paramedics that caused Richard=s death and that the delay thus 
amounts to an affirmative harm that resulted in the deprivation of Richard=s 
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constitutionally protected right to life, Appellant has really only re-framed the 
assertion made by the plaintiffs in Brown, namely that inadequate emergency 
services constitute a constitutional deprivation because, if those services were 
delivered properly, there would have been a different and better outcome from 
the emergency in question.  While we sympathize deeply with Appellant in the 
untimely death of his son, Appellant has not, for the same reasons explained in 
Brown, alleged Aa >direct causal link= between the policy [regarding emergency 
services] and a constitutional violation.@  Id. at 482.  Consequently, the judgment 
of the District Court will be affirmed. 
